Bart Streumer

Faculty of Philosophy
University of Groningen
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Employment

Professor of Philosophy, University of Groningen, the Netherlands, 2013-present.
Reader in Philosophy (equivalent to Associate Professor), University of Reading, UK, 2011-2013.
Lecturer in Philosophy (equivalent to Assistant Professor), University of Reading, UK, 2005-2011.
Research Fellow in Philosophy, Fitzwilliam College, University of Cambridge, UK, 2002-2005.

Area of specialisation

Metaethics

Areas of competence

Ethics, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Political Philosophy

Education

PhD in Philosophy, University of Reading, UK, 2003. Thesis title: *Reasons, Reasoning and Free Will*. Supervisor: Jonathan Dancy.
MA in Philosophy, University of Reading, UK, 1999.
Doctorandus (equivalent to MA) in Philosophy, with first year in Economics and one year in Journalism, University of Groningen, the Netherlands, 1998.

Publications

Book

1. *Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory About All Normative Judgements*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017 (hardback) and 2023 (paperback).

Edited book

2. *Irrealism in Ethics*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014.

Journal articles

3. 'How to Be a Self-Effacing Consequentializing Quasi-Realist'. *Ethics* 136 (2026): 843-873.
4. 'How Berkeley Can Go Quasi and Lose His Mind-Dependence'. Forthcoming in

Philosophers' Imprint.

5. 'A New Transcendental Argument for Robust Realism'. Forthcoming in *Ratio* (special issue in memory of Philip Stratton-Lake).
6. 'Quasi-Realism for Realists'. *Philosophers' Imprint* 25 (10) (2025).
7. 'Superspreading the Word'. *Noûs* 58 (2024): 927-947.
8. 'Standing Up for Supervenience'. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 109 (2024): 138-154.
9. 'Do Formal Objections to the Error Theory Overgeneralize?' (with Daniel Wodak). *Analysis* 83 (2023): 732-741.
10. 'Why Formal Objections to the Error Theory Fail' (with Daniel Wodak). *Analysis* 81 (2021): 254-262.
11. 'Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either'. *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 13 (2016): 419-436 (part of a symposium on Jonas Olson's *Moral Error Theory*).
12. 'Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths?' (with Daan Evers). *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* 10 (2016).
13. 'Can We Believe the Error Theory?' *Journal of Philosophy* 110 (2013): 194-212.
14. 'Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World?' *Ratio* 26 (2013): 450-470 (special issue on irrealism in ethics). Also in Bart Streumer (ed.), *Irrealism in Ethics*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014.
15. 'Are Normative Properties Descriptive Properties?' *Philosophical Studies* 154 (2011): 325-348.
16. 'Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties?' *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 86 (2008): 537-561.
17. 'Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning'. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 74 (2007): 1-29.
18. 'Reasons and Entailment'. *Erkenntnis* 66 (2007): 353-374.
19. 'Reasons and Impossibility'. *Philosophical Studies* 136 (2007): 351-384.
20. 'Does "Ought" Conversationally Implicate "Can"?' *European Journal of Philosophy* 11 (2003): 219-28.
21. 'Can Consequentialism Cover Everything?' *Utilitas* 15 (2003): 237-47.

Book chapters

22. 'So What'. Forthcoming in Wouter Kalf and Bruno Verbeek (eds.), *New Perspectives on the 'Now What?' Question*. Abingdon: Routledge.
23. 'Reasons and Ability'. In Daniel Star (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
24. 'Why We Really Cannot Believe the Error Theory'. In Diego Machuca (ed.), *Moral Skepticism: New Essays*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2017.
25. 'Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties'. In David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker and Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), *Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
26. 'Practical Reasoning'. In Timothy O'Connor and Constantine Sandis (eds.), *A Companion to the Philosophy of Action*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
27. 'Procedural and Substantive Practical Rationality' (with Brad Hooker). In Alfred Mele and Piers Rawling (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Rationality*. Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2004.

Replies to responses to my work

28. 'I Ought to Reply, So I Can'. *Philosophia* 47 (2019): 1547-1554.
29. 'Précis of *Unbelievable Errors*' and 'Response to Hattiangadi, Evers, and Tiefensee'. *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 16 (2019): 687-696, 743-754 (part of a symposium on *Unbelievable Errors*, with Anandi Hattiangadi, Daan Evers, and Christine Tiefensee).
30. 'Précis of *Unbelievable Errors*' and 'Response to Jackson, Stratton-Lake, and Schroeder'. *International Journal for the Study of Skepticism* 8 (2018): 257-269, 322-341 (part of a symposium on *Unbelievable Errors*, with Frank Jackson, Philip Stratton-Lake, and Mark Schroeder).
31. 'No, We Cannot'. *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 24 (2016): 537-546.
32. 'Reasons, Impossibility and Efficient Steps: Reply to Heuer'. *Philosophical Studies* 151 (2010): 79-86.
33. 'Semi-Global Consequentialism and Blameless Wrongdoing: Reply to Brown'. *Utilitas* 17 (2005): 226-30.

For students

34. 'The Unbelievable Truth About Morality'. In Lenny Clapp (ed.), *Philosophy for Us*. San Diego: Cognella, 2017.
35. 'De Vergissingstheorie'. In Martin van Hees, Thomas Nys and Ingrid Robeyns (eds.), *Basisboek Ethiek*. Amsterdam: Boom, 2014.

Book reviews

36. Review of Joshua Gert, *Normative Bedrock*. *Ethics* 124 (2014): 606-12.
37. Review of David Sobel and Steven Wall (eds.), *Reasons for Action*. *Analysis* 71 (2011): 200-202.
38. Review of Ingmar Persson, *The Retreat of Reason*. *Times Literary Supplement*, 9 November 2007.
39. Review of Robert Audi, *The Good in the Right*. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, July 2005.
40. Review of Liam B. Murphy, *Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory*. *Ratio* 17 (2004): 357-62.

Research grants and awards

1. Arts and Humanities Research Council Fellowship, January-September 2012 (covered full salary for nine months).
2. Faculty of Arts and Humanities award for relief of teaching, Spring 2009 (covered replacement teaching for one term).
3. Stipendiary Research Fellowship, Fitzwilliam College, University of Cambridge, 2002-5 (covered full salary for three years).
4. Arts and Humanities Research Board Postgraduate Scholarship, 1999-2002 (covered PhD fees).
5. University of Reading Faculty of Letters and Social Sciences Research Scholarship, 1999-2002 (covered PhD living expenses).

6. Laurie Brain Prize for the best incoming graduate student of 1998-9, Department of Philosophy, University of Reading.
7. British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Chevening Scholarship, 1998-9 (covered part of MA fees and living expenses).
8. Dutch Ministry of Education Talent Programme Scholarship, 1998-9 (covered other part of MA fees and living expenses).
9. ISVW Prize for the best paper based on a Dutch or Flemish MA thesis in Philosophy, 1998.

PhD students supervised

1. Leo Eisenbach, thesis on ethics and epistemology (2025-present, with Thomas Schmidt, joint degree with Humboldt University of Berlin).
2. Qingyuan Gu, PhD thesis on metaethics (2023-present, with Daan Evers).
3. Eline Gerritsen, *Demystifying Normativity: Morality, Error Theory, and the Authority of Norms* (2020-2022, with Kent Hurtig and Daan Evers, joint degree with St Andrews/Stirling).
4. Yixin Jin, visiting PhD student from Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, China (October 2018 to October 2019).
5. Conrad Bakka, visiting PhD student from Stockholm University, Sweden (September 2018 to February 2019, with Daan Evers).
6. Erik Kassenberg, *New Problems for Moral Anti-Realism* (2016-2021, with Daan Evers).
7. Herman Veluwenkamp, *Objectivity Without Reality* (2015-2020, with Daan Evers).
8. Patrick Hassan, *Nietzsche on the Value of Suffering* (2012-2013, with David Owens).
9. David Mutch, *A Metaethic Made Useful: A Wittgenstein-inspired Approach to Metaethics* (2012-2013, with Severin Schroeder).
10. Karolina Jasser, *Judgement and Motivation* (2011-2013, with David Owens).
11. George Mason, *What Is the Virtuous Emotional Response to Our Wrongdoing?* (2011-2013, with David Owens).
12. Noa Leibowitz, *Moral Realism and Disagreement* (2010-2013, with Philip Stratton-Lake).
13. Amna Whiston, *Moral Judgements and Motivation* (2009-2013, with Philip Stratton-Lake).
14. Molly Knight, *The Nature of Moral Responsibility: Sorting Out Our Intuitions* (2008-2012, with Galen Strawson).
15. Auke Pols, visiting PhD student from Eindhoven University of Technology, the Netherlands (Autumn 2009, with Jonathan Dancy).
16. Andrea Lechler, *A Principled Approach to Decision-Making Which Appears not to be Guided by Principles* (2007-2011, with Brad Hooker).
17. Alex Gregory, *Why Do People Do Things?* (2007-2011, with Jonathan Dancy).
18. Andy Taylor, *Moral Responsibility and Subverting Causes* (2006-2010, with Galen Strawson).

PhD students examined

1. Opponent for Paiman Karimi, *Relaxing Normativity: Essays on Relaxed Approaches to*

Realism about Normativity (2024, University of Gothenburg, Sweden).
2. External examiner for David Hunt, *How to Be a Child, and Bid Lions and Dragons Farewell: the Consequences of Moral Error Theory* (2020, University of Birmingham, UK).
3. Jury member for Christopher Lamothe, *A Defence of Moral Revisionism* (2020, University of Luxembourg).
4. External examiner for Matthew Scarfone, *The Trouble about Moral Facts* (2019, McGill University, Canada).
5. Opponent for Emma Beckman, *Mistaken Morality? An Essay on Moral Error Theory* (2018, Umeå University, Sweden).
6. External examiner for Raymond Boyce, *Catching the Cow's Eye: The Spectacle as Moral Reason* (2014, Open University, UK).
7. Internal examiner for Richard Rowland, *The Normative and the Evaluative: A Defence of the Buck-Passing Account of Value* (University of Reading, UK, 2013).
8. External examiner for Christopher Jay, *Realistic Fictionalism* (2012, University College London, UK).
9. External examiner for Ryo Chonabayashi, *A Defence of Metaphysical Ethical Naturalism* (2012, University of Cardiff, UK).
10. Internal examiner for Anne Raustøl, *Impartiality and Partiality in Nursing Ethics* (University of Reading, UK, 2011).
11. Internal examiner for Valerio Salvi, *Chisholm and Intrinsic Value* (University of Reading, UK, 2009).
12. Internal examiner for Mark Young, *Internalism for Externalists* (University of Reading, UK, 2007).

Undergraduate and MA teaching

First-year courses
Introduction to Ethics (Groningen, 2014-15, 2015-16, 2016-17, 2017-18, 2018-19, 2019-20, 2020-21, 2021-22, 2022-23)
Values and Virtues (Reading, 2012-13)
Free Will (Cambridge, 2003-4)

Second-year courses
Metaethics (Groningen, 2020-21, 2021-22, 2023-24, 2024-25, 2025-26, 2026-27, with Daan Evers)
Free Will and Responsibility (Groningen, 2024-25, 2025-26, 2026-27, with Pauline Kleingeld)
Epistemology and Philosophy of Science (Groningen, 2025-26, 2026-27, with Leah Henderson)
Moral Philosophy (Reading, 2005-6, 2006-7, 2009-10, 2010-11, 2012-13)
Early Modern Philosophy: Locke (Reading, 2011-12)
Contemporary Political Philosophy (Reading, 2005-6, 2006-7, 2007-8, 2009-10)
Early Modern Philosophy: Berkeley (Reading, 2007-8)
Reasons for Action (Cambridge, 2004-5)

Third-year courses
Consequentialism and Contractualism (Groningen, 2026-27)
Social Contract Theory (Groningen, 2025-26)
Freedom and Responsibility (Groningen, 2018-19)
Equality and Global Justice (Groningen, 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16)
Free Will and Responsibility (Reading, 2009-10, 2010-11, 2011-12)
Metaethics (Reading, 2007-8)
International Ethics (Reading, 2005-6, 2006-7)
Irrealism in Ethics (Cambridge, 2004-5)
Moral Particularism (Cambridge, 2003-4)
Incommensurability and Moral Dilemmas (Cambridge, 2002-3)

MA courses
Advanced Metaethics: Expressivism and Relativism (Groningen, 2023-24, 2024-25, 2025-26, 2026-27, with Daan Evers)
Truth (Groningen, 2026-27)
Analytical Nihilism (Groningen, 2025-26, 2026-27)
The Metaphysics of Properties (Groningen, 2024-25, 2025-26)
Research in Practice (Groningen, 2015-16, 2016-17, 2017-18, 2018-19, 2019-20, 2020-21, 2021-22, with Lodi Nauta, 2022-23, with Martin Lenz)
Core Issues: Nihilism (Groningen, 2018-19, 2019-20, 2020-21)
Core Issues: Non-Cognitivism (Groningen, 2016-17, 2017-18)
Advanced Metaethics (Groningen, 2014-15, 2015-16, 2016-17, 2019-20)
Social Contract Theory (Groningen, 2013-14, 2014-15)
Advanced Moral Psychology and Metaethics (Groningen, 2013-14)

Courses for non-philosophy students
Social and Political Philosophy (minor, Groningen, 2017-18)
Introduction to Ethics (minor, Groningen, 2013-14)
Introduction to Ethics (honours college, Groningen, 2013-14)

Individual supervision
BA and MA dissertations (Groningen, 2013-present).
BA and MA essays and dissertations (Reading, 2005-2013).
Undergraduate supervisions on Ethics, Political Philosophy, Metaphysics and Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, 2002-5).

Administrative responsibilities

University of Groningen
Chair of the Faculty Council, 2025-present.
Vice Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy, 2021-2024.
Chair of the Department of Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, 2020-21.
Director of Graduate Studies in Philosophy, 2015-2019.
Member of the Examinations Committee, 2014-2015.

University of Reading
Departmental Director of Research, Spring 2013.
Coordinator of the MA in Philosophy and the MA in Ethics and Political Theory, 2006-2011.
Chair of the Philosophy MA seminar, 2006-2011.
Undergraduate Admissions Tutor for Philosophy, 2007-2011.
Open and Visit Day organiser for Philosophy, 2007-2011.
Coordinator of the Undergraduate Philosophy Society, 2005-2008.
Disability Representative, 2005-2008.
Careers Liaison Officer, 2005-2008.

University of Cambridge
Director of Studies in Philosophy, Fitzwilliam College, 2004-5.
Director of Studies in Philosophy, Girton College, Michaelmas 2003.
Assessor for the first year Philosophy Examinations (Ethics), 2003 and 2004, and for the second year Philosophy Examinations (Metaphysics and Philosophy of Mind), 2005.
Admissions interviewer for Philosophy, Fitzwilliam College, 2002-5.

Academic visits

Five day Erasmus visit to the University of St Andrews, UK, April 2023.
Five day Erasmus visit to Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany, November 2022.
Lecturer in four-day Summer School *Ethics, Empathy, and Errors*, University of Tartu, Estonia, June 2019.
Seven day Erasmus visit to the University of Durham, UK, March 2019.
Seven day Erasmus visit to Stockholm University, Sweden, March 2018.
Five day Erasmus visit to Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany, May 2017.
Ten day Erasmus visit to Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, November 2016.

Presentations

Invited
1. 'How to Be a Self-Effacing Consequentializing Quasi-Realist'. Section Keynote, European Conference of Analytic Philosophy (ECAP12), Complutense University of Madrid, Spain, August 2026.
2. 'A New Transcendental Argument for Robust Realism'. Section Keynote, Swedish Congress of Philosophy, Stockholm University, Sweden, June 2026.
3. 'A New Transcendental Argument for Robust Realism'. Metaethics Workshop, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Germany, February 2026.
4. 'How to Be a Self-Effacing Consequentializing Quasi-Realist'. Uppsala University, Sweden, February 2026.
5. 'A New Transcendental Argument for Robust Realism'. Umeå University, Sweden, February 2026.
6. 'How to Be a Self-Effacing Consequentializing Quasi-Realist'. University of Tokyo, Japan, December 2025.
7. 'How Berkeley Can Go Quasi and Lose His Mind-Dependence'. Trinity College Dublin,

Ireland, November 2025.

8. ‘How Berkeley Can Go Quasi and Lose His Mind-Dependence’. Philosophy Department Colloquium Lecture, Harvard University, USA, September 2025.
9. ‘How to Be a Self-Effacing Consequentializing Quasi-Realist’. Ethics Seminar, Boston University, USA, September 2025.
10. ‘Why Philip Stratton-Lake Was Right After All’. Ratio Conference in memory of Philip Stratton-Lake, University of Reading, UK, May 2025.
11. ‘How Berkeley Can Go Quasi and Lose his Mind-Dependence’. University of Reading, UK, October 2024.
12. ‘How Berkeley Can Go Quasi and Lose his Mind-Dependence’. University of Nottingham, UK, October 2024.
13. ‘Error Theorists Should Be Robust Realists’. University of Sheffield, UK, October 2024.
14. ‘Error Theorists Should Be Robust Realists’. Workshop on Expressivism and Transcendental Arguments, University of Tampere, Finland, August 2024.
15. ‘Error Theorists Should Be Robust Realists’. Workshop on Metanormativity, University of Gothenburg, Sweden, January 2024.
16. ‘Error Theorists Should Be Robust Realists’. Workshop on the ‘Now What’ problem, University of Leiden, the Netherlands, December 2023.
17. ‘Quasi-Realism for Realists’. MetaEssen workshop, University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany, November 2023.
18. ‘Quasi-Realism for Realists’. Paper Jam, University of Edinburgh, UK, April 2023.
19. ‘Superspreading the Word’. University of St Andrews, UK, April 2023.
20. ‘Quasi-Realism for Realists’. Moral Philosophy Reading Group, University of St Andrews, UK, April 2023.
21. ‘The Error Theory and Other Unbelievable Theories’. Philosophy Society, University of St Andrews, UK, April 2023.
22. ‘Superspreading the Word’. University of Stirling, UK, April 2023.
23. ‘Superspreading the Word’. Faculty Colloquium, Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany, November 2022.
24. ‘Do Formal Objections to the Error Theory Overgeneralize?’ Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany, November 2022.
25. ‘Superspreading the Word’. Workshop on Quasi-Realism, University of Sheffield, UK, July 2022.
26. ‘Do Formal Objections to the Error Theory Overgeneralize?’ Virtual Metaethics Colloquium, online, May 2022.
27. ‘Superspreading the Word’. Joint Seminar of Hong Kong University, Lingnan University, and National University of Singapore, November 2021.
28. ‘Standing Up for Supervenience’. Workshop on Normative Irrealism, Soka University, Japan, December 2019.
29. ‘Standing Up for Supervenience’. Cyprus Metaethics Workshop, University of Cyprus, April 2019.
30. ‘Standing Up for Supervenience’. New Approaches to Moral Error Theory Workshop, University of Leeds, UK, March 2019.
31. ‘Standing Up for Supervenience’. University of Durham, UK, March 2019.
32. ‘So What’. Workshop on the Error Theory, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, December 2018.

33. ‘How to Both Accept and Reject Nihilism’. Umeå University, Sweden, May 2018.
34. ‘Reduction Without Supervenience’. Stockholm University, Sweden, March 2018.
35. ‘Reduction Without Supervenience’. University of Reading, UK, February 2018.
36. ‘How to Both Accept and Reject Nihilism’. Moral Philosophy Seminar, University of Oxford, UK, February 2018.
37. ‘Reduction Without Supervenience’. Serious Metaphysics Group, University of Cambridge, UK, February 2018.
38. ‘How to Both Accept and Reject Nihilism’. Workshop on Nihilism, University of Manchester, UK, September 2017.
39. ‘How to Both Accept and Reject Nihilism’. University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany, July 2017.
40. ‘Why We Really Cannot Believe the Error Theory’. Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany, May 2017.
41. ‘Reduction Without Supervenience’. Third Varieties of Normativity Workshop, Uppsala University, Sweden, April 2017.
42. ‘Irresponsible Equality’. Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, November 2016.
43. ‘The Error in Non-Cognitivism and the Truth in the Error Theory’. Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, March 2016.
44. ‘Why Reductive Realism is False’. University of Bielefeld, Germany, May 2015.
45. ‘Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either’. Book symposium on Jonas Olson’s *Moral Error Theory*, Stockholm University, Sweden, January 2015.
46. ‘Irresponsible Equality’. University of Reading, UK, December 2013.
47. ‘Unbelievable Errors’. University of Birmingham, UK, March 2013.
48. ‘Philosophical Views on Practical Reasoning’. Thematic School on Practical Reasoning, University of Lugano, Switzerland, November 2012.
49. ‘Can Moral Intuitions Refute the Error Theory?’ Conference on Emotions, Psychology and Moral Judgements, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, June 2012.
50. ‘Reasons and Ability’. Philosophy and Ethics Seminar, Eindhoven University of Technology, the Netherlands, May 2012.
51. ‘Can We Believe the Error Theory?’ Tilburg University, the Netherlands, April 2012.
52. ‘Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties’. Research Seminar in Practical Philosophy, Uppsala University, Sweden, December 2011.
53. ‘Can We Believe the Error Theory?’ Stockholm Philosophy Colloquium, Stockholm University, Sweden, December 2011.
54. ‘Believing for No Reason’. Workshop on Norms of Belief, University of Southampton, UK, September 2011.
55. ‘Artefacts and Normativity’. Workshop on Actions and Artefacts, Eindhoven University of Technology, the Netherlands, September 2011.
56. ‘Can We Believe the Error Theory?’ Reasons for Action Seminar, University of London, UK, November 2010.
57. ‘Can We Believe the Error Theory?’ Lund-Reading Philosophy Workshop, Lund University, Sweden, May 2010.
58. ‘Can We Believe the Error Theory?’ University of Southampton, UK, November 2009.
59. ‘Are Normative Judgements Non-Cognitive Attitudes?’ University of Sheffield, UK, February 2009.

60. ‘Are Normative Judgements Non-Cognitive Attitudes?’ Open University, Milton Keynes, UK, January 2009.
61. ‘Are Normative Properties Descriptive Properties?’ University of Birmingham, UK, May 2008.
62. ‘Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties?’ Moral Philosophy Seminar, University of Oxford, UK, October 2007.
63. ‘Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning’. University of Bristol, UK, December 2004.
64. ‘Reasons and Impossibility’. Moral Sciences Club, University of Cambridge, UK, January 2004.

Refereed

65. ‘Error Theorists Should Be Robust Realists’. Humboldt Normativity Workshop, Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany, August 2024.
66. ‘Standing Up for Supervenience’. Conference of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy, Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany, September 2022.
67. ‘Superspreading the Word’. Conference of the British Society for Ethical Theory, online, July 2022.
68. ‘Reduction Without Supervenience’. Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, Open Sessions, University of Edinburgh, July 2017.
69. ‘Non-Cognitivism, Relaxed Realism, and Symmetry’. Conference on Robust and Relaxed Moral Realism, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, February 2017.
70. ‘Irresponsible Equality’. Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, Open Sessions, University of Cambridge, July 2014.
71. ‘Irresponsible Equality’. Conference of the Dutch Research School in Philosophy, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands, November 2013.
72. ‘Reasons and Ability’. St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality (SLACRR), University of Missouri–St. Louis and Washington University–St. Louis, USA, May 2013.
73. ‘Reasons and Ability’. Fourth Annual Dutch Conference on Practical Philosophy, Eindhoven University of Technology, the Netherlands, November 2012.
74. ‘Are Normative Judgements Non-Cognitive Attitudes?’ Third Annual Dutch Conference on Practical Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, October 2011.
75. ‘Are Normative Judgements Non-Cognitive Attitudes?’ Eighth Annual Metaethics Workshop, University of Wisconsin–Madison, USA, September 2011.
76. ‘Can We Believe the Error Theory?’ Second Annual Dutch Conference on Practical Philosophy, University of Groningen, the Netherlands, October 2010.
77. ‘Can We Believe the Error Theory?’ Conference of the British Society for Ethical Theory, University of Nottingham, UK, July 2010.
78. ‘Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties?’ Conference of the British Society for Ethical Theory, University of Bristol, UK, July 2007.
79. ‘Reasons and Entailment’. Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, University of Manchester, UK, July 2005.
80. ‘Reasons and Impossibility’. Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, University of Kent, UK, July 2004.
81. ‘Are There Two Kinds of Reasoning?’ Conference of the British Society for Ethical Theory, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands, July 2000.

82. ‘The Normative Force of Arguments’. Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, University of Sheffield, UK, July 2000.
83. ‘Can Consequentialism Cover Everything?’ Conference of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies, Wake Forest University, USA, March 2000.

Comments on others

84. Responses to Chris Cowie and Louise Hanson. Mini-Symposium on *Unbelievable Errors*, University of Durham, UK, March 2019.
85. Responses to Nicholas Laskowski, Christine Tiefensee, Anandi Hattiangadi, and Daan Evers. Symposium on *Unbelievable Errors*, University of Groningen, May 2018.
86. Responses to Victor Moberger, Stina Björkholm, and Conrad Bakka. Symposium on *Unbelievable Errors*, Stockholm University, March 2018.
87. Comments on Daniel Fogal and Olle Risberg, ‘The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations’. Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, March 2018.
88. Comments on Anandi Hattiangadi, ‘Logical Disagreement’. Workshop on Companions in Guilt Arguments, Australian Catholic University, Rome, Italy, September 2017.
89. Comments on Martin Glazier, ‘Being Someone Else’. Midsummer Philosophy Workshop, University of Leeds, UK, June 2017.

Outreach

1. ‘Ongelofelijke vergissingen’ (‘Unbelievable Mistakes’). Internationale School voor Wijsbegeerte, Leusden, August 2025.
2. ‘Zijn we verantwoordelijk voor wat we doen?’ (‘Are We Responsible for What We do?’). Student Association Yir’at ’Adonay, Groningen, January 2025.
3. ‘Sense and Nonsense’. Debate with Timothy Williamson and Nancy Cartwright, *How the Light Gets In* Festival, Hay-on-Wye, UK, March 2019.
4. ‘Equality Without Responsibility’. TEDx University of Groningen, Groningen, June 2016.
5. ‘Gelijk of genoeg?’ (‘Equal or Enough?’). Lecture for philosophy teachers in secondary education, University of Groningen, November 2015.
6. ‘Ongelijkheid en verantwoordelijkheid’ (‘Inequality and Responsibility’). Café Philos, Groningen, April 2015.
7. ‘Ongelijkheid’ (‘Inequality’). Nacht van de Filosofie, Groningen, April 2015.
8. ‘Zijn we nergens verantwoordelijk voor?’ (‘Are We Not Responsible for Anything?’). Symposium for secondary school pupils, University of Groningen, January 2015.
9. ‘Het verhaal van de moraal’ (‘The Story of Morality’). Student Association Yir’at ’Adonay, Groningen, October 2014.
10. ‘Waarom niemand verantwoordelijk is’ (‘Why No One is Responsible for Anything’). Nacht van de Filosofie, Groningen, April 2014.
11. Dialogue with Hallvard Lillehammer on the Error Theory, Forum for European Philosophy, London School of Economics, UK, February 2011.

Other academic activities

Associate editor of the *Journal of Moral Philosophy*, 2020-2025.
Associate editor of *Ratio*, 2007-2013.
Co-organiser of the annual Groningen Metaethics Workshop, 2019-present.
Organiser of the 2012 *Ratio* Conference, University of Reading.
Co-organiser, with Wlodek Rabinowicz, of the Lund-Reading Philosophy Workshop, Lund University, Sweden, May 2010.
Organiser of the British Society for Ethical Theory Conference, University of Reading, July 2009.
Assessor of tenure or promotion cases at the University of Wisconsin (2018), the University of Edinburgh (2018), the Frankfurt School of Finance and Management (2019), and the University of Durham (2020).
Assessor for the joint application scheme for Junior Research Fellowships at Churchill College, Fitzwilliam College, Murray Edwards College, Selwyn College, St Edmund's College, and Trinity Hall, University of Cambridge, 2015.
External member of Open University validation panel for the BA in Philosophy at the American College of Greece in Athens, March 2011.
Book proposal (×2) and manuscript (×3) reviewer for Oxford University Press.
Referee for *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Analysis* (×5), *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (×18), *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* (×3), *Dialectica*, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* (×15), *Ethics* (×8), *Ergo* (×8), *Erkenntnis* (×6), *European Journal of Philosophy* (×4), *Inquiry* (×3), *Journal of Ethics* (×3), *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* (×8), *Journal of Moral Philosophy* (×3), *Journal of Philosophy* (×4), *Journal of the American Philosophical Association* (×6), *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, *Journal of Value Inquiry*, *Mind* (×6), *Noûs* (×9), *Philosophers' Imprint* (×2), *Philosophia* (×4), *Philosophical Papers* (×3), *Philosophical Psychology*, *Philosophical Review*, *Philosophical Studies* (×18), *Philosophical Quarterly* (×6), *Philosophy*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (×4), *Philosophy Compass*, *Polish Journal of Philosophy*, *Ratio* (×13), *Res Philosophica* (×3), *Review of Metaphysics*, *South African Journal of Philosophy*, *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, *Synthese* (×9), *Utilitas* (×6), British Society for Ethical Theory (×10), Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop.